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Methods of statistical physics have proven valuable for studying the evolution of cooperation in social
dilemma games. However, recent empirical research shows that cooperative behavior in social dilemmas is
only one kind of a more general class of behavior, namely moral behavior, which includes reciprocity, respect-
ing others’ property, honesty, equity, efficiency, as well as many others. Inspired by these experimental works,
we here open up the path towards studying other forms of moral behavior with methods of statistical physics.
We argue that this is a far-reaching direction for future research that can help us answer fundamental questions
about human sociality. Why did our societies evolve as they did? What moral principles are more likely to
emerge? What happens when different moral principles clash? Can we predict the break out of moral conflicts
in advance and contribute to their solution? These are amongst the most important questions of our time, and
methods of statistical physics could lead to new insights and contribute towards finding answers.
Introduction
Our time now is unique and special in that we are arguably
richer, safer, and healthier than ever before [1, 2], but simul-
taneously, we are also facing some of the greatest challenges
of our evolution. Climate change, the depletion of natural re-
sources, staggering inequality, the spread of misinformation,
persistent armed conflicts, just to name a few examples, all
require our best efforts to act together and to renounce part
of our individual interests for the greater good. Understand-
ing when, why, and how people deviate from their best self-
interest to act pro-socially, benefitting other people and the
society as a whole, is thus amongst the most important aims
of contemporary scientific research.
Pro-social behavior can come in many forms, the most stud-
ied of which is cooperation. Indeed, cooperation is so impor-
tant that many have contended that our capacity to cooper-
ate at large scales with unrelated others is what makes hu-
man societies so successful [3–14]. Moreover, the psycholog-
ical basis of cooperation, shared intentionality, that is, ‘the
ability and motivation to engage with others in collaborative,
co-operative activities with joint goals and intentions’ is what
makes humans uniquely human, as it is possessed by children,
but not by great apes [15].
Although human cooperation is believed to originate from
our evolutionary struggles for survival [16], it is clear that the
challenges that pressured our ancestors into cooperation today
are gone. Nevertheless, we are still cooperating, and on ever
larger scales, to the point that we may deserve being called
‘SuperCooperators’ [17]. Taking nothing away from the im-
mense importance of cooperation for our evolutionary success
and for the wellbeing of our societies, recent empirical re-
search shows, however, that to cooperate is just a particular
manifestation of moral behavior [18]. And while methods of
statistical physics have been used prolifically to study cooper-
ation [14], other forms of moral behavior have not. Our goal
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here is to outline the many possibilities for future research at
the interface between physics and moral behavior, beyond the
traditional framework of cooperation in social dilemmas.
Cooperation
To study cooperative behavior, scientists use social
dilemma games, such as the prisoner’s dilemma [19], the stag
hunt [20], or the public goods game [21]. In these games,
players have to decide whether to cooperate or to defect: co-
operation maximizes the payoff of the group, while defection
maximizes the payoff of an individual. This leads to a conflict
between individual and group interests, which is at the heart
of each social dilemma, and in particular at the heart of the
cooperation problem.
Since cooperating is not individually optimal, cooperative
behavior cannot evolve among self-interested individuals, un-
less other mechanisms are at play. Several mechanisms for
the evolution of cooperation have been identified and studied,
including kin selection [22], direct reciprocity [23], indirect
reciprocity [24], social preferences [25–28], the internaliza-
tion of social heuristics [29], translucency [30], cooperative
equilibria [12, 31, 32], as well as many others.
One realistic mechanism for the evolution of cooperation is
network reciprocity. Everyday interactions among humans do
not happen in a vacuum. We are more likely to interact and
cooperate within our network of family members, friends, and
coworkers, and we rarely interact, let alone cooperate, with
strangers. One can formalize this situation by assuming that
individuals occupy the vertices of a graph and interact only
with their neighbors. Can this spatial structure promote the
evolution of cooperation? The answer is yes [33]. And the
intuition is that, in this setting, cooperators can form clusters
and protect themselves from the invasion of defectors [34–36].
These ‘games on graphs are difficult to analyze mathemati-
cally’, but ‘are easy to study by computer simulations’ [9].
Games on networks present the natural setting in which one
can apply the techniques and methods of statistical physics
and network science to study cooperation [37, 38], as well as
other forms of moral behavior.
2Statistical physics of human cooperation
Methods of statistical physics have come a long way in
improving our understanding of the emergence of coopera-
tion and the phase transitions leading to other counterintuitive
evolutionary outcomes. Research has revealed that such out-
comes depend on the structure of the social network, the type
and strength of interactions, and on the complexity and num-
ber of competing strategies [39–49]. Aspects particularly rel-
evant to human cooperation have also been studied in much
detail [14]. The workhorse behind this research has been the
spatial public goods game [50, 51], with extensions towards
different forms of punishment [52–58], rewarding [59–62],
and tolerance [63], to name just some examples. The Monte
Carlo method is thereby typically used [64], which ensures
that the research is aligned with statistical physics methodol-
ogy. This in turn enables a comparison of simulation results
with generalized mean-field approximations [65–67], and a
proper determination of phase transitions between different
stable strategy configurations [45]. Ultimately, the goal is to
identify and understand pattern formation, the spatiotemporal
dynamics of solutions, and the principles of self-organization
that may lead to socially favorable evolutionary outcomes.
As an example of an evolutionary game that yields an im-
pressively intricate phase diagram, we mention an 8-strategy
public goods game with diverse tolerance levels. The phase
diagram is presented in Fig. 1 of [63], based on which several
observations can be made. In the first place, we can observe
that higher tolerance levels are supported by higher multipli-
cation factors in the public goods game, and vice versa. This is
in agreement with experience, in that overly tolerant strategies
cannot survive in the presence of other less tolerant strategies.
From the viewpoint of the considered 8-strategy public goods
game this is also not surprising, because players adopting the
most tolerant strategy act as loners only if everybody else in
the group is a defector. And evidently, such naive tolerance
can not compete with other less tolerant strategies that also
compete in the game. Secondly, the phase diagram also re-
veals that if the cost of inspection is too high, or if the value
of the multiplication factor is either very low or very high,
tolerance is not viable at all. Even if one tries out different
tolerance levels, the evolutionary pressure from other strate-
gies is simply too strong.
While it is beyond the scope of this work to go further into
details, it should be noted that phase diagrams as the one pre-
sented in Fig. 1 of [63] provide an in-depth understanding of
the evolutionary dynamics and of the phase transitions that
lead from one stable strategy configuration to the other. The
key for obtaining accurate locations of phase transition points
and the correct phases is the application of the stability anal-
ysis of competing subsystem solutions [64]. A subsystem
solution can be formed by any subset of all the competing
strategies, and on their own (if separated from other strate-
gies) these subsystems solutions are stable. If the subsystem
solution is formed by a single strategy this is trivially true, but
it can be likewise true if more than one strategy forms a sub-
system solution. The dominant subsystem solution, and hence
the phase that is ultimately depicted in the phase diagram as
the stable solution of the whole system, can only be deter-
mined by letting all the subsystem solutions compete against
each other.
By means of this approach, several important insights have
been obtained. By peer-based strategies, for example, we note
the importance of indirect territorial competition in peer pun-
ishment [68], the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance
in rewarding [59], and an exotic first-order phase transition
observed with correlated strategies [69]. By institutionalized
strategies, we have observed the fascinating spatiotemporal
complexity that is due to pool punishment [53], while in the
realm of self-organization of incentives for cooperation, we
have demonstrated the elevated effectiveness of adaptive pun-
ishment [54], the possibility of probabilistic sharing to solve
the problem of costly punishment [56], and the many evolu-
tionary advantages of adaptive rewarding [61]. With antisocial
strategies, we have shown the restoration of the effectiveness
of prosocial punishment when accounting for second-order
free-riding on antisocial punishment [58], and the rather sur-
prising lack of adverse effects with antisocial rewarding [62].
While this is just a short snippet of statistical physics re-
search concerning human cooperation, it hopefully showcases
successfully the potency of the approach for studying complex
mathematical models that describe human behavior, thus rec-
ommending itself also for relevantly studying other types of
moral behavior to which we attend to in what follows.
Moral behavior
Empirical research has indeed shown that cooperation in
social dilemmas is only one facet of a more general class of
behavior – moral behavior. When subjects are asked to re-
port what they think is the morally right thing to do in social
dilemmas, they typically answer: ‘to cooperate’ [18].
Morality is universal across human societies. Virtually all
societies adopt behavioral rules that are presented to the peo-
ple as moral principles. But where do these rules come from?
A classical non-scientific explanation, still adopted by many
societies and religious thinkers, is that they are emanated di-
rectly from God. However, in recent years, social scientists
have been developing a scientific theory of morality, accord-
ing to which morality evolved as a a mechanism ‘to promote
and sustain cooperation’ [70]. As psychology-star Michael
Tomasello put it: ‘humanmorality arose evolutionarily as a set
of skills and motives for cooperating with others’ [71]. Sim-
ilar positions have also been put forward in [72–77]. How-
ever, the word ‘cooperation’ in these statements does not refer
only to cooperation in social dilemmas. How does this general
form of cooperation translates into specific behaviors?
A recent study exploring morality in 60 societies across the
world found that seven moral rules are universal: love your
family, help your group, return favors, be brave, defer to au-
thority, be fair, and respect others’ property. Although, what
is not universal is how they are ranked [77]. Of course, not all
these rules are easy to study using simple games on networks,
but some are. For example, ‘returning favors’ can be studied
using a sequential prisoner’s dilemma, in which the players
3do not choose their strategy simultaneously, but sequentially.
Alternatively, it can be studied using the trust game [78]. In
the trust game, player 1 starts with a sum of money and has
to decide how much of it, if any, to transfer to player 2. Any
amount transferred gets multiplied by a factor larger than 1
and handed to player 2. Then player 2 has to decide howmuch
of it to keep and how much of it to return to player 1.
Similarly, ‘help your group’ can be studied using games
with labeled players, in which agents come with a label rep-
resenting the group(s) they belong to [79]. ‘Fairness’ can be
studied using the ultimatum game [80], as has already been
done along these lines [45, 81–90], or the dictator game [91].
‘Respect others’ property’ can be studied using games with
special frames, as, for example, the Dictator game in the Take
frame, for which it is known that taking is considered to be
more morally wrong than giving [92].
Beyond these seven rules, there are other forms of moral
behavior that are worth studying, as, for example, ‘honesty’.
A common game theoretic paradigm to study honest behav-
ior is the sender-receiver game [93]. In this game, player 1
is given a private information (for example, the outcome of a
die) and is asked to communicate this piece of information to
player 2. Player 1 can either communicate the truthful piece
of information, or can lie. The role of player 2 is to guess the
original piece of information. If player 2 guesses the origi-
nal piece of information, then players 1 and 2 are both paid
according to some option A. Conversely, if player 2 does not
guess the original piece of information, then players 1 and 2
are both paid according to option B. Crucially, only player 1
knows the payoffs associated with options A and B. A variant
of this game in which player 2 makes no choice has also been
introduced and studied [94, 95], in order to avoid the confound
of sophisticated deception, that is, players who tell the truth
because they believe that player 2 will not believe them [96].
Other important forms of moral behavior that ought to be
investigated are ‘equity’, that is, a desire to minimize pay-
off differences among players; ‘efficiency’, that is, a desire to
maximize the total welfare; and ‘maximin’, that is, a desire
to maximize the worse off payoff. These types of behavior
are usually studied using simple distribution experiments, in
which people have to decide between two or more allocations
of money [18, 27, 28, 97, 98].
Discussion
Methods of statistical physics and network science have
proven to be very valuable for successfully studying the evo-
lution of cooperation in social dilemma games. However, em-
pirical research shows that this kind of behavior is only one
form of a more general class of moral behavior. The later
includes love your family, help your group, return favors, be
brave, defer to authority, be fair, respect others’ property, hon-
esty, equity, and efficiency, as well as many others. We have
outlined a set of games and mathematical models that could
be used efficiently to study particular aspects of some of these
forms of moral behavior.
Taken together, the application of statistical physics to
study the evolution of moral behavior has the potential to be-
come a flourishing and vibrant avenue of future research. We
believe so for two reasons. In the first place, it would allow
us to understand why our societies evolved as they did and
which moral principles are more likely to evolve. Secondly,
since many social conflicts are ultimately conflicts between
different moral positions [99–101], exploring the evolution of
moral behavior could allow us to predict in advance the con-
sequences of a moral conflict, and suggest strategies to avoid
it or, in case it is unavoidable, strategies to minimize its costs.
We hope that at least parts of our vision will be put to practice
in the near future.
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